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WHEN EPA CLEANS A CERCLA SITE:
PRECLUSION OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT
JUDICIAL REVIEW WITH RESPECT TO
GENERATORS AND TRANSPORTERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Hazardous waste' generators 2 and transporters3 have routinely dis-
I. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has listed as hazardous more than
1,050 discrete substances and more than 100 chemical mixtures. These substances in-
clude heavy metals such as lead and berlyllium, inorganic compounds such as sulfuric
acid and complex organic compounds such as dioxin, toluene and vinyl chloride.
Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (table) (1987).
Further, the EPA "Administrator shall promulgate and revise as may be appropriate"
the list of hazardous substances. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation & Liability Act (CERCLA) § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
The Federal Register prints amendments to the hazardous substances list as they are
promulgated.
CERCLA defines "hazardous substance" as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any
. . substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous
waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6921] (but not including any waste
the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 6901] has
been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section
1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the
Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. § 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical
substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15.
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp. IV 1986).
CERCLA designates hazardous substances by reference to other environmental stat-
utes. For example, the Title 33 sections in (A) and (D), supra, are part of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter
Clean Water Act]. Section 2606 of Title 15 is a section of the Toxic Substances Control
Washington University Open Scholarship
188 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 36:187
posed hazardous wastes at third-party disposal sites.4 The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may initiate remedial
action to clean up a waste site pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980' (CERCLA). The EPA must determine that a hazardous
substance or an imminently and substantially dangerous material from
the site has polluted, or substantially threatens to pollute, the environ-
ment.6 Congress enacted CERCLA section 113(h)7 as part of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 19868 (SARA)
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-29 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. A hazardous waste generator is:
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances....
CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
This section does not predicate responsibility on a person's generation of waste. Bro-
kers, who may never take physical possession of waste, may be responsible for waste
cleanup under CERCLA. United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (E.D. Mo.
1987).
3. A hazardous waste transporter is "any person who accepts or accepted any haz-
ardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance." CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
4. Estimates of the number of hazardous waste sites vary widely. Compare EPA
Updates List of Hazardous Waste Sites, CHEMICAL & ENG'G NEWS, Feb. 9, 1987, at 21,
col. 1 (report of the EPA's enlargement of the national priorities list which estimates
26,000 sites) with States News Service, Jan. 14, 1988 (General Accounting Office report
criticizing the EPA's underestimation and estimating potentially 425,000 sites).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). CERCLA is Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94
Stat. 2676 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)).
6. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The EPA, pursu-
ant to CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982 & Supp. IV), may also compel responsi-
ble parties to decontaminate a waste site.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (Supp. IV 1986) (as added by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act § 113(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1650 (Supp. IV 1986))
[hereinafter SARA], provides in pertinent part: "No Federal court shall have jurisdic-
tion under Federal law ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial action
selected under section 9604 of this title,... in any action except ... an action under
section 9607 of this title to recover costs or damages or for contribution." Id.
8. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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expressly to preclude, with only limited exceptions, judicial review of
such remedial actions. After the EPA completes a response action, the
agency may recover it costs9 by bringing suit against persons ° poten-
tially responsible for the waste site. Thus, a generator or transporter,
although possibly liable for the EPA's remedial action costs, may not
obtain judicial review of the cleanup action until the EPA sues for cost
recovery.
Enacted in 1980, CERCLA's principal purpose is prompt hazardous
waste site cleanup.11 Specifically, Congress intended the Act to ad-
dress rapidly the problem of abandoned waste sites such as Love Canal
near Buffalo, New York, and the "Valley of the Drums" near Louis-
ville, Kentucky. 2 Congress enacted SARA in 1986 to reinvigorate
CERCLA through increased funding13 and clarification of unsettled
issues. These issues include contribution,14 intervention, 15 public par-
ticipation,16 settlements,' 7 citizens suits,' 8 and judicial review.19
9. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986). The EPA initially
bears the cleanup costs using "Superfund" money. CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Congress authorized the expenditure of $8.5 billion between
October 1986 and October 1991 for CERCLA's purposes. CERCLA § 111(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The United States district courts have juris-
diction over EPA cost-recovery suits pursuant to CERCLA § 113(a), (b), (h) 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(a), (b), (h) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
10. CERCLA defines "person" to include "an individual, firm, corporation, associ-
ation, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Govern-
ment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body." CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (Supp. IV 1986). Courts may also
hold corporate officers personally liable. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
& Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (imposition of CERCLA liability
"upon only the corporation and not the individual corporate officers and employees
who are responsible for making corporate decisions about the handling and disposal of
hazardous substances would open an enormous, and clearly unintended, loophole"),
aff'g 579 F. Supp. 823, 847-48 (W.D. Mo. 1984), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987); see
also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (a managing
stockholder may be held "liable... as an 'owner or operator' ").
11. Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985).
12. 126 Cong. Rec. H26,761 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980); see also H.R. REP. No.
1016(I), reprinted in part in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 6119, 6119-20
(discussion of gaps in previous law which Congress intended CERCLA to fill).
13. Congress initially funded Superfund with $1.6 billion. 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6119. See supra note II for current funding.
14. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (Supp. IV 1986).
15. CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
16. CERCLA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (Supp. IV 1986).
17. CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. IV 1986).
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
190 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 36:187
SARA codified the traditional preclusion of judicial review of gov-
ernment agency action with respect to EPA cleanup efforts. This Note
analyzes the constitutionality of preclusion with respect to transporters
and generators. Section II reviews the potential liability of generators
and transporters, addressing the assessments of responsibility, strict lia-
bility, and joint and several liability. Section III summarizes the rea-
sons for the pre-SARA preclusion of judicial review and analyzes the
constitutionality of the preclusion codification. Finally, section IV sug-
gests methods generators and transporters may use to protect their in-
terests when faced with preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review.
II. POTENTIAL LIABILITY
A. Responsibility
Section 107(a) of CERCLA makes hazardous substance generators
and the past and present owners and operators of waste disposal facili-
ties responsible for the reparation costs of improper waste disposal.20
A court may also hold responsible a transporter who selected and used
a waste site for a customer.21 One suggested method for determining a
party's liability 2 is to ask, "Who decided to place the waste into the
hands of a particular [hazardous waste] facility? '23 A court may also
18. CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Supp. IV i986).
19. CERCLA § 9613(h), 0i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), Ci) (Supp. IV 1986).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Specifically, responsible parties are liable
for "all costs of removal or remedial action.., not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan;... damages for and injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
[including assessment costs]; and the costs of any [authorized] health assessment or
health effects study .. " Id.
21. On its face, CERCLA § 107(a)(4) holds liable for response costs any person
who transports hazardous substances to any place from which there is a release or
threatened release. CERCLA § 101(20), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(C) (Supp. IV 1986), ex-
cludes common or contract carriers from the definition of "owner or operator" if they
have not caused or participated in the release in question. A transporter who merely
carries waste to a third-party site at the specific request of a generator should not be
responsible for releases that the transporter could not control. Thus, the phrase "se-
lected by such person," as employed by CERCLA § 107(a)(4) in the definition of trans-
porter, seems to modify disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels, and sites, as
opposed to sites alone. Cf New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n. 16
(2d Cir. 1985) (construing a phrase in CERCLA § 107(a)(4) to apply to CERCLA
§§ 107(a)(l)-(3)).
22. Courts may presume that a waste disposal company's routine use of numerous
third-party disposal sites indicates that the waste disposal company, rather than the
waste generator, chose the hazardous waste disposal sites.
23. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984); see
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hold responsible as a generator a party who exercised ownership over
the waste which it brought to third-party sites. 24
Section 107(b)(3) 25 of CERCLA provides the generator or trans-
porter with three specific affirmative defenses. These defenses absolve
from responsibility those parties who prove that the release or the
threat of release was caused by an act of God, an act of war, or the act
or omission of a third party.2 6 To employ the third-party defenses suc-
cessfully, a generator or transporter must also prove that it exercised
due care with regard to the hazardous substances at issue and acted to
prevent foreseeable acts, omissions, or consequences caused by any
third party.27
Although the courts have not established the minimum level of due
care required to satisfy the statute and thus preclude responsibility, the
decision in O'Neil v. Picillo28 suggests a very high threshold to the in-
vocation of a third-party defense. The O'Neil court addressed the
also New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding
that persons cannot contract away their responsibility under CERCLA, nor may a gen-
erator escape liability for its disposed waste by characterizing the disposal as a sale).
24. A & F Materials, 582 F. Supp. at 845; see supra note 2 for the definition of a
generator and its reference to ownership.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982).
26. Id. CERCLA § 107(b)(3) absolves those
who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused
solely by (I) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omis-
sion occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly with the defendant....
Id.
But cf Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1986). In Wagner Seed
Co., lightning struck Wagner Seed's warehouse, starting a fire which caused the release
of toxic chemicals. The court affirmed that the district court "lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider a challenge on the merits to an EPA order before the EPA
initiated an enforcement action." Id. at 317. Wagner Seed Co. strongly suggests that a
party may invoke the act of God defense only after the EPA has sued to compel action
or to recover costs.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). A party invoking an affirmative defense has the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (Supp. IV 1986) (definition of the term "contractual relation-
ship" as it appears in CERCLA § 107(b)(3)); CERCLA § 101(35)(B), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(B) (1986) (statutory guidelines for judicial determination of due care); ef
United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1305 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (willful ignorance of
how a third party disposes of a hazardous substance precludes use of the CERCLA's
§ 107(b)(3) third-party defense).
28. 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988).
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third-party defense raised by defendants Rohm and Haas Company,
Exxon Research and Engineering Company, and American Cyanamid.
Although Robin and Haas "clear[ly] ... took every precaution" in its
waste disposal,29 the court found the company liable for cleanup costs
due to the hazardous nature of the waste and the mere presence of the
material at the waste site. The court next found that "Exxon employed
every precaution to prevent the illegal and/or improper disposal of its
waste."30 The court indicated a willingness to hold Exxon liable as it
did Rohm and Haas, but noted that a lack of evidence regarding the
toxicity of the Exxon wastes precluded the imposition of liability.3" Fi-
nally, the court held American Cyanamid liable for cleanup costs
notwithstanding its asserted diligence.32 The court based its holdings
on CERCLA's strict liability scheme and on conflicting evidence con-
cerning American Cyanamid's diligence.33
B. Strict Liability
Courts generally hold generators and transporters strictly liable for
government response costs incurred under section 104 of CERCLA.34
29. Id. at 720. The company separated its wastes into categories, packed the waste
in 58-gallon metal, open-head drums cushioned with vermiculite and absorbent materi-
als, and disposed of the waste through a licensed transporter. Id. Further, the company
contracted with the transporter to deliver the drums "exclusively to licensed disposal
sites in Pennsylvania and New Jersey with the directions stating, 'Disposal of these
waste materials is not to be in violation of an ordinance, regulation or law of responsibil-
ity for safe delivery and disposal after leaving [the premises].'" Id. The company never
consigned any material for delivery to the waste site where it was found. Id.
30. Id at 722. Exxon hired a transporter licensed by New Jersey and the federal
government. Id at 721. Further, Exxon employees visited the disposal sites of its trans-
porters to be assured of the adequacy of the disposal sites. Id.
31. Id. at 722.
32. Id at 723. Cyanamid personnel visited its transporter's facility and inspected its
incinerator and licenses. Id at 722.
33. Id. at 722-23. Cyanamid had an exclusive contract with its transporter. The
company was aware of an excessive number of drums on the transporter's property and
of an incident in which the transporter was linked to improper waste disposal. Id. at
723.
34. J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985). The Peters court
dismissed a suit for declaratory judgment brought by current and former owners and
operators of industrial waste storage facility, ruling that the suit was untimely filed.
The court cited the following cases to support its holding that CERCLA § 107 (1980)
imposes strict liability: Bulk Distribution Centers v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437
(S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 810 F.2d 726, 749 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 146 (1987); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983); United
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In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co.,35 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that
CERCLA section 101(32)36 incorporates the liability standard which
Congress codified in section 311 of the Clean Water Act.37 The court
relied on appellate court decisions" to conclude that section 101(32)
imposes strict liability.39
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Peters, 767 F.2d at 266.
35. 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Multiple defendants used two
services to dispose of hazardous industrial waste. Id. at 1139. The disposal services
bribed city employees to gain permission to dump hazardous waste at a city landfill. Id.
The court, ruling on a motion for a judgment on the pleadings, found that a controversy
existed and allowed the city to pursue its CERCLA claim against the defendants. Id. at
1154. The court noted that under CERCLA the defendants would be strictly liable for
the city's response costs. Id. at 1140.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (Supp. IV 1986). The statute provides that "[t]he term
'liable' or 'liability' under this subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liabil-
ity which obtains under section 1321 of Title 33 [§ 311 of the Clean Water Act
(CWA)]." CWA § 311 contains that Act's hazardous substance provisions. See, eg.,
CWA § 311(f), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (Supp. V 1987) (providing liability for removal
costs).
37. Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. at 1140 n.4. Congress addressed owner and opera-
tor liability in § 3 11(f) and third-party liability in § 311(g) of the CWA. See 33 U.S.C.
1321 (Supp. V 1987). The legislature bound the courts to hold owners and operators
liable for discharges of oil or hazardous substances unless the defendant could prove
that the "discharge was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C)
negligence on the part of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a
third party without regard to whether any such act or omission was or was not negli-
gent .... CWA § 311(fXl), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (Supp. V 1987). The third-party
exemption in clause (D) appears to negate the theory of strict liability. CWA § 311(g)
states, however, that
[w]here an owner or operator... alleges that such discharge was caused solely by
* . . a third party, such owner or operator shall pay to the United States govern-
ment the actual costs incurred ... and shall be entitled by subrogation to all rights
of the United States Government to recover such costs from such third party....
CWA § 311(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (Supp. V 1987).
Thus, taken together, §§ 311(f) and (g) support the strict liability theory, yet allow
third-party contribution.
38. Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. at 1140 n.4. At least four federal courts of appeals
have held CWA § 311 imposes strict liability: United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing
Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981); Steuart
Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1978); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564
F.2d 964, 982 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
39. Stepan Chem., 544 F. Supp. at 1140 n.4.
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C. Joint and Several Liability
CERCLA does not explicitly authorize courts to impose joint and
several liability on CERCLA violators. 4 Congress debated the codifi-
cation of joint and several liability but deleted the standard from the
final law.a" The watershed case concerning joint and several liability
under CERCLA is United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.42 The Chem-
Dyne court considered the Act's legislative history in construing the
Act, but did not take individual legislators' comments as controlling.4 3
Instead, the court constructed the liability standard from the overall
presentation of the legislative history.' The court did not consider
CERCLA's absence of references to joint and several liability as dis-
positive, but, based on its reading of the legislative history, found that
Congress deleted joint and several liability to avoid potentially inequi-
table results.45 The court held that Congress did not intend the dele-
tion to preclude a court's imposition of joint and several liability;4 6
instead, courts may apply joint and several liability as equity demands
on a case-by-case basis.4 7
The Chem-Dyne court held that the imposition of joint and several
liability on a defendant turns on the distinctiveness of the harm caused
by the particular defendant and on the reasonableness of the basis for
40. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 806-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
41. The Committee on Environment and Public Works, reporting on S. 1480 (an
unenacted predecessor bill to CERCLA), stated that anything less than joint and several
liability would penalize the innocent victims of environmental disasters, while benefiting
those who have caused the damage. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1980);
see also 126 Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). Senator Helms, however,
worried that the inclusion of joint and several liability could result in extensive responsi-
bility for a party who only minimally contributed to a waste site. 126 Cong. Rec.
S15,004 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980). Representative Florio explained that Congress de-
leted the reference to joint and several liability to allow the courts to apply "common or
previous statutory law" to cases as they arose. 126 Cong. Rec. H111,787 (daily ed. Nov.
24, 1980).
42. 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). In Chem-Dyne, the United States sued 24
defendants to recover the Superfund expenditures used to restore a site. Id. at 804.
"The Chem-Dyne facility contain[ed] a variety of hazardous wastes from 289 generators
or transporters, consisting of about 608,000 pounds of material." Id. at 811.
43. Id. at 807. In particular, the court stated that Senator Helms' construction of
the statute, see supra note 41, was not entitled to deference because he was an opponent
of CERCLA. Id. at 806.
44. Id. at 808.
45. Id at 807-08.
46. See, eg., Rep. Florio's remarks, supra note 41.
47. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808.
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apportionment.48 At common law, courts may hold multiple persons
causing a single indivisible harm jointly and severally liable.49 Because
hazardous waste sites often contain wastes from many companies,5"
courts often encounter difficulty apportioning liability between respon-
sible parties in EPA cost-recovery actions. 51
Apportionment may also create a no-win situation for a CERCLA
defendant. A party wishing to limit its liability through apportionment
must substantiate the extent of its involvement at the dump site.52
48. Id. at 810. To support its conclusion, the court cited the RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 881 (1964) (provisions defining apportionment and contribu-
tion respectively). See also Prager, Apportioning Liability for Cleanup Costs Under
CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L. REv. 198 (1986-87) (analyzing CERCLA liability
apportionment).
49. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875
(1964) provides a general rule for contributing tortfeasors: "Each of two or more per-
sons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the
injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm." Id.
50. See infra note 113 for the number of parties in three representative cases.
51. In United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985), five
parties estimated the number of drums of waste they had shipped to the site: Lilly
Chemical Products, Inc., 670 drums; General Electric, 458 drums; Solvents Recovery
Service Of New England, Inc., 5,962 drums; Lewis Chemical Corporation, 732 to 900
drums; Great Lakes Container Corporation, 500 to 700 drums. Id. at 1396. Neverthe-
less, the court held that "the exact amount or quantity of deleterious chemicals or other
noxious matter cannot be pinpointed as to each defendant. The resulting proportionate
harm to surface and groundwater cannot be proportioned with any degree of accuracy
as to any individual defendant." Id.
More recently, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island held
in O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp 706 (D.R.I. 1988), that § 881 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts was applicable in EPA cost-recovery actions. Id. at 723 That provision
states that "equitable shares of the liability with respect to an indivisible injury are
appropriately resolved in an action for contribution .. " RErSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 881 (1964). The court noted that the cost-recovery action quickly restores the
EPA's funds used to perform future cleanups. O'Neill, 682 F.2d at 726. Apportion-
ment of liability during the trial would slow the EPA's fund recovery. Id. Thus, "fair-
ness and equitable apportionment [may be] more properly addressed in a subsequent
contribution action." Id at 725-26.
52. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 810. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B (1976) (presenting the burden of proof among the parties in apportionment
cases).
The EPA may accept business records to substantiate allegations of waste site contri-
bution. In United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983), the government
offered loading tickets, indicating that a potentially responsible party (PRP) may have
sent waste to a site, to persuade the court to deny Price's requested summary judgment.
Id. at 1107. The court noted that although the loading tickets were admissible as evi-
dence to deny summary judgment, they might not be admissible as trial evidence. Id. at
1116 n.13.
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Supporting evidence, however, could disadvantage the party, in the ab-
sence of evidence that other parties also contributed to the waste at the
site, by locking a defendant into a share of the liability which may be
greater than its actual liability. Evidence submitted by a party may not
mitigate that party's liability unless the site's total amount of waste is
estimable. The evidence may simply constitute an admission by the
submitting party. Even if the total amount of waste sent to a site is
known, the courts might not view waste volume as "an accurate pre-
dictor of the risk associated with [a] waste. . . ."'I Commingling of
wastes from several sources increases the difficulty of apportionment,
leaving courts with little choice but to impose joint and several liability
on generators and transporters. 4
III. PRECULSION OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Introduction
Before Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),5 which codifies the judicial reviewability of agency action,56
the United States Supreme Court presumed that agency actions were
judicially reviewable, notwithstanding the absence of express congres-
sional authorization.57 Pursuant to the APA, courts may review statu-
torily reviewable agency actions as well as final agency actions for
which court remedies are inadequate.5 8 Congress granted a right of
53. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 811.
54. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
55. Codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344,
4301(2)(E), 5335(a)(B), 5362, 7521 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
56. Administrative Procedure Act §§ 2(a)-(g), 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1982 &
Supp. II 1984) [hereinafter APA]. These sections address application and definitions,
right of review, form and venue of proceeding, actions reviewable, relief pending review,
and scope of review.
57. Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1944) ("The authority for a judicial
examination of the validity of the Secretary's action is found in the existence of courts
and the intent of Congress as deduced from the statutes and precedents.").
58. APA § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). The statute defines those agency actions
which may be final:
A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Except as
otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is final...
whether or not there has been presented or determined an application for a declara-
tory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency otherwise re-
quires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal
to superior agency authority.
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judicial review, however, to persons wronged by agency action "within
the meaning of a relevant statute."59 The Supreme Court has since
stated that the APA's judicial review provisions apply to grievants un-
less Congress has clearly and convincingly indicated otherwise.' °
The APA qualifies the right to judicial review, however, if the con-
troversial statute "preclude[s] judicial review or [if] agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.",61 Most statutes limiting judi-
cial review restrict, but do not prohibit, review.62 Statutes which re-
Id.
59. APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
60. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1961) The Rusk court affirmed a district
court holding that Cort had a right of review under the APA for denial of a passport,
notwithstanding the statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, which neither showed an intention to provide a remedy nor indicated that existing
remedies were to be denied. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-40
(1966) (the underlying legislation does not prohibit pre-enforcement review of FDA
regulations).
61. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). Courts may consider many factors when
determining whether an action is committed to agency discretion. See generally Safer-
stein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82
HARV. L. REv. 367 (1968) (suggesting that partial review may be feasible in some cir-
cumstances). Courts consider factors such as: the presence of broad agency discretion;
the importance of expertise to understanding the subject matter; the use of managerial
structure in creating the agency involved; the impropriety of judicial intervention; the
necessity of informal agency processes; the inability of a reviewing court to ensure a
correct result; the need for expedience; the quantity of potentially appealable agency
actions; and the existence of other methods to prevent abuse of agency discretion. Id.
The Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), upheld as unreview-
able an agency's action which was committed to the agency's discretion by law. In
Heckler, prison inmates petitioned the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take
enforcement actions against drugs used for human executions. Id. at 823-24. The FDA
exercised its discretionary authority and refused to act. Id. at 824. In the petitioners'
suit to compel the FDA's action, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the FDA. Id. at 825. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the FDA's refusal
to act was "irrational." Id at 827. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals, id. at 827, 838, holding that judicial review is precluded if "the statute
is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's exercise of discretion." Id. at 830.
62. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN, & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
238 (1986). Congress may enact statutes which preclude judicial review. The courts,
however, will review the constitutionality of such statutes. Congress has precluded re-
view of Veterans' Administration (VA) decisions, thus ensuring that veteran benefit
claims do not burden the courts and the VA. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982). Further-
more, preclusion ensures that the technical determinations and applications of VA pol-
icy regarding veterans' benefits are made adequately and uniformly. See generally
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (involving preclusion of judicial review of 38
U.S.C. § 211(a)).
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strict judicial review do not necessarily violate due process if they
afford a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.63
B. Pre-SARA Preclusion of Judicial Review
The EPA's response to a potential waste site ranges from listing the
site for future remedial investigation and feasibility study' to cleaning
up the site.65 Before SARA's enactment, courts found that section
9604 of CERCLA implicitly disapproved of pre-enforcement judicial
review. 66 The bench routinely dismissed challenges to most EPA re-
sponse actions, short of cost-recovery suits, for two primary reasons:




Section 10(c) of the APA68 allows courts to review final agency ac-
tions if court remedies are inadequate. 69  In Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner,7° the Supreme Court stated that courts should consider an
63. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,433, 443 (1944) (Congress may constitu-
tionally define inferior federal court jurisdiction and thus limit judicial review to specific
courts).
64. See, e.g., SCA Servs. of Ind. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (N.D. Ind.
1986). Potential Superfund sites are listed on the National Priorities List of the Na-
tional Contingency Plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
65. SCA Servs, 634 F. Supp. at 1358.
66. See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). The court stated that the policy of preclusion of pre-
enforcement judicial review applied to both emergency situations and remedial actions.
Id.
67. Pacific Resins and Chems., Inc. v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 249, 252-53
(W.D. Wash. 1986). The Pacific Resins court, citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1966), found that Pacific Resins' suit against the EPA was not ripe for
review because final agency action was lacking and because the plaintiff would not suffer
hardship. Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 253. The company had not demonstrated any
urgency, was not subject to penalties, and had not incurred liability. Id.
The Pacific Resins court also addressed the requirement for standing, noting that "[a]
litigant must demonstrate a 'distinct and palpable injury' to himself." Id. (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)). The court also noted that receipt of a notice
letter represents only the possibility of injury, which is, in itself, insufficient to gain
standing. Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 253.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982).
69. See supra note 58 (quoting APA § 10(c), which defines "final" agency actions).
70. 387 U.S. 136 (1966) (holding that regulations governing the content of drug
labels and advertising were final and, thus, reviewable).
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agency action "final" if the action defines an agency's position, has a
"'direct and immediate... effect on the day-to-day business' of the
complaining parties," has the status of law, and requires "immediate
compliance."'" Prior to SARA, most courts held on the basis of these
factors that EPA actions under CERCLA, short of cost-recovery suits,
are not final agency actions.1
2
In Pacific Resins and Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 3 the EPA
notified Pacific Resins that the Agency had undertaken a remedial in-
vestigation and had identified the company as a potentially responsible
party (PRP). The EPA's notice letter also offered the company an op-
portunity to participate in the financing of remedial measures at the
waste site and required the company to provide certain information.'
Pacific Resins sought declaratory relief in federal district court con-
cerning its liability.7 5 The court held that the EPA's notice letter was
not a final agency action. 6 The court agreed with the EPA that the
letter did not define the agency's position, since a number of questions
remained concerning the waste site's decontamination.7 7 Furthermore,
the letter had no legal force and did not require judicial review to
achieve enforcement or efficiency purposes.7 8
Other courts have interpreted CERCLA as providing an "adequate
remedy in court," albeit after the EPA completes its response activity
and sues for section 107 cost recovery.79 The Pacific Resins court
noted that the company could challenge the EPA's response action
during a section 107 cost-recovery suit as inconsistent with the Na-
71. Id. at 151-52.
72. United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 610 F. Supp. 527, 528 (D.N.M. 1985)
(EPA response activity, consisting of a remedial investigation and feasibility study,
neither requires defendant action nor assigns liability and, thus, is not final).
73. 654 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
74. Id. at 251. The EPA required the company to furnish information pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1982). 654 F. Supp. at 251.
75. Id. at 250.
76. Id. at 252-53.
77. Id. at 252. Neither the court nor the EPA identified which factors were
unresolved.
78. Id. at 252.
79. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985) (cost-
recovery trial under CERCLA § 107 is adequate safeguard of complainants's objections
and comments), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d
263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (CERCLA § 107 cost-recovery suit will afford a PRP an ade-
quate remedy in court; the EPA may not impose any costs inconsistent with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan (NCP)); Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 255.
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tional Contingency Plan."° If the CERCLA defendant prevailed, the
court would not allow the EPA to recover any such costs."
Finally, in B.R. Mackay & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 2 the United
States District Court for the District of Utah held that in declaratory
judgment actions, judicial review is unavailable prior to EPA's initia-
tion of a cost-recovery action, even if the EPA had completed its
cleanup.83 Thus, the generator or transporter will waste its resources
should it attempt to obtain a declaratory judgment concerning its
liability.
2. Frustration of CERCLA's Purposes
In Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,84 the Supreme Court held
that the extent to which "a particular statute precludes judicial review
is determined not only from its express language, but also from the
structure of the statutory scheme, its objective, its legislative history,
and the nature of the administrative action involved."85 Both CER-
CLA's legislative history and statutory structure support the conclu-
sion that CERCLA's purpose is to act quickly against hazardous waste
sites without awaiting a judicial determination of liability.86
80. Id. at 255. Congress mandated the creation of an NCP in CERCLA § 105, 42
U.S.C. § 9605 (Supp. IV 1986).
81. 654 F. Supp. at 255. Citing with approval the J V Peters case, the court held
the EPA may not recover costs for actions inconsistent with the NCP. Id. Congress
expressly limited the EPA to actions that are consistent with the NCP and which "the
President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment."
CERCLA § 9604(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
82. 633 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Utah 1986).
83. Id. at 1295. The court noted that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2202 (1982 & Supp. 111984), does not establish ajurisdictional basis independ-
ent of CERCLA. Id. In Mackay, the EPA completed a cleanup and billed the poten-
tially responsible company $235,000. During settlement negotiations, the company filed
for a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for EPA's expenditures. The court
dismissed the company's action based on CERCLA's philosophy of denying judicial
intervention of cleanup procedures and on precedent in the Tenth Circuit. Mackay, 633
F. Supp. at 1297. See In re Combustion Equip. Assoc., 838 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1988)
(declaratory judgment action concerning the discharge in bankruptcy of environmental
cleanup liability is not ripe for review before the EPA sues for cost recovery); Pacific
Resins & Chems., Inc. v. United States, 654 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (declara-
tory judgment requires finality and ripeness of the underlying issue).
84. 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
85. Id at 345.
86. Pacific Resins, 654 F. Supp. at 253; see also United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Congress enacted CERCLA "to provide rapid
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To obtain rapid results, Congress implicitly granted the EPA broad
discretion in CERCLA enforcement.8 7 The EPA's discretionary au-
thority is based on the need for expertise in the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. Determinations of appropriate removal and remedial ac-
tions are within the EPA's discretion because they require specialized
knowledge and expertise.88 A reviewing court's function is neither to
arbitrate between scientific experts nor to judge the validity of opposing
expert theories, 9 but rather to test the EPA's decisions against the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard.'
Courts recognize the number of potential CERCLA actions is im-
mense.9 1 A number of courts, recognizing this potential in CERCLA's
language, structure, objectives, legislative history, and the EPA's dis-
cretionary authority, have concluded that pre-enforcement judicial re-
responses to the nationwide threats posed by 30-50,000 improperly managed hazardous
waste sites").
87. Congress' implicit grant of discretionary authority is evident throughout CER-
CLA. For example, Congress authorized the President to act when a "substantial
threat" of pollution exists. See CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(A)(1) (Supp. IV
1986). The President may also "delegate and assign any duties pr powers imposed upon
him or assigned to him and to promulgate any regulations necessary to carry out" CER-
CLA's provisions. CERCLA § 115, 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1986). Furthermore, "the ad-
ministrator shall promulgate and revise as may be appropriate, regulations designating
... hazardous substances." CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
Finally, the administrator shall use his discretion to determine reportable quantities.
Id.
88. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 748
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987).
89. "Choice among scientific test data is precisely the type of judgment that must be
made by EPA, not this court." Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 115 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
90. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 748. See United States v. Ward, 618
F. Supp. 884, 900 (E.D.N.C. 1985). The Ward court held that PRPs "may not seek to
have the court substitute its own judgment for that of the EPA. [PRPs] may only show
that the EPA's decision about the method of cleanup was 'inconsistent' with the NCP in
that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in the discharge of their duties under the
NCP." Id. See also United States v. Dickerson, 660 F. Supp. 227, 231 (M.D. Ga. 1987)
("to establish its right to conduct a response action .... the EPA must establish" that its
decision to do so is not "arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law").
91. Considering the number of hazardous waste sites and the number of PRPs at
each site, one can imagine countless potential CERCLA suits. "To delay remedial ac-
tion until the liability situation is unscrambled would be inconsistent with the statutory
plan to promptly eliminate the sources of danger to health and environment." Lone
Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986). Lone Pine involved 142 PRPs. Id
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view would frustrate CERCLA's purposes.92
C. Preclusion of Judicial Review by SARA
1. Validity
Congress expressly precluded pre-enforcement judicial review when
it enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986." a Statutory preclusion effectively rebuts the presumption ofjudi-
cial reviewability94 and moots the question whether CERCLA re-
sponse actions are committed to EPA's discretion. Although federal
circuit courts have established that pre-enforcement judicial review is
unavailable under the APA, the courts have yet to determine the con-
stitutionalty of section 113(h) of CERCLA.
Congress, limited solely by the Constitution, may control federal
court jurisdiction.95 Federal courts are typically hostile to statutes that
seek to preclude judicial review of cases involving the deprivation of an
individual's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that administrative decisions concerning property rights are not
reviewable if Congress has statutorily precluded such review and the
litigants are not challenging an agency on due process grounds.96 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan re-
cently addressed this aspect of the constitutionality of section 113(h) in
92. See, eg., Lone Pine, 777 F.2d at 888 (CERCLA's purpose would be frustrated
by pre-enforcement judicial review), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986); J.V. Peters &
Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 58 (1985) ("Pre-enforcement review would... delay ... cleanups, would increase
response costs, and would discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups.")); see gener-
ally S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1980); 126 Cong. Rec. 26,757-98 (1980);
126 Cong. Rec. 30,897-30,987 (1980).
93. See supra note 7 for text of statute.
94. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984) (specific lan-
guage may overcome the presumption of judicial reviewability).
95. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. Further, "The
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S.
CoNs-r. art. III, § 1. For a thorough discussion of Congress' authority to expand and
restrict federal court jurisdiction, see P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D. SHA-
PIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 362, 424
(1988).
96. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act purported to preclude judicial re-
view of certain deportation orders, thereby affecting the personal right of citizenship.
The Supreme Court held in Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955), that such
orders were reviewable, notwithstanding the statutory preclusion of review. The Court
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South Macomb Disposal Authority v. United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.97 The court found that because section 113(h) does not
absolutely bar review, but simply alters the timing of review,98 the stat-
ute is constitutional.99
The Supreme Court has addressed due process concerns in two
veins: generally, with respect to a balancing of factors; and specifically,
with regard to statutory preclusion of judicial review. The Court ex-
amines three factors to determine what process is due: the private in-
terest at risk; the risk of deprivation of that interest and the safeguards
against such deprivation; and the corresponding government inter-
est."° In cases of environmental liability, the private interest is often
the capital invested. Courts must weigh this private interest against the
public's interest in a clean environment and the government's interest
in a court docket free of frivolous appeals.10 1
In Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,"°2 the Court held that
when property rights are in controversy, due process requires that the
government afford the litigant a hearing and a judicial determina-
tion. °3 Due process requires a hearing before the final administrative
order becomes effective, but not regarding an agency's preliminary de-
explained that Congress enacted APA §§ 10, 12 "to remove obstacles to judicial review
of agency action." Id. at 51.
In contrast, Congress enacted the Dent Act to compensate persons for "supplies or
services furnished or losses incurred in helping the government during the war." Work
v. United States ex reL Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 178 (1925). Compensation is a type of
property. The Act expressly precluded judicial review of certain discretionary decisions
of the Secretary of the Interior. Id at 180. The Court upheld the preclusion of judicial
review as a proper exercise of Congress' power. The Court also upheld preclusion of
judicial review in Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960). The Schilling Court justified
preclusion of the review of money or property claims under the Trading with the En-
emy Act based on statutory language which allowed World War I claims, but did not
mention World War II claims. Id. at 671. The Court also cited legislative history as
support for its decision. Id. at 671-73.
97. 681 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
98. Id. at 1251.
99. Id. at 1251-52.
100. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
101. SARA also added language to CERCLA mandating that remedial actions
under § 104 be cost effective. CERCLA § 121(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
This language, and its implied penalty that the party cleaning up a site will be unable to
obtain reimbursment if its actions are not cost effective, tends to safeguard PRPs' finan-
cial interests.
102. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
103. Id. at 599 (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931)
("Where only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is
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cision.' ° When EPA has cleaned up a hazardous waste site but has
not commenced a cost-recovery action, the agency has not assessed the
liability of the potentially responsible parties. Thus, a final administra-
tive order has not become effective and due process does not require a
hearing. Although site owners could argue that the EPA violated their
due process rights by trespassing on their land, courts might not allow
a generator or transporter, as a third party, to complain.10 5
Potentially responsible parties could argue that an EPA response ac-
tion is a trespass or invasion of private property10 6 that violates the
not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial determina-
tion of the liability is adequate.").
This footnote's aforementioned cases are distinguishable from Aminoil, Inc. v. EPA,
599 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1984). The Aminoil court held that due process requires
that a hearing "be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Id. at
74. Aminoil claimed the assessment of daily fines and treble damages infringed upon its
due process rights. Id. Typically, once the EPA has cleaned up a hazardous waste site
and is about to initiate a § 104 cost-recovery action, liability is postponed until the trial
so that the PRPs have an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
104. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. at 598; Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA,
777 F.2d 882, 886 (3d Cir. 1985) ("In property deprivation cases, due process does not
require access to the courts before final administrative action."), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986).
The Eleventh Circuit recently followed and extended the Lone Pine rationale in Dick-
erson v. EPA, 834 F.2d 974 (1lth Cir. 1987), aff'g United States v. Dickerson, 660 F.
Supp. 227 (M.D. Ga. 1987). Dickerson owned a waste site and filed suit to enjoin the
EPA from initiating a response action at the site. 834 F.2d at 976. He argued that
"barring pre-enforcement judicial review constitutes a denial of due process because
some of the [waste removed from the property] may be resold." Id. at 978 n.7. The
court, citing Lone Pine, summarily dismissed Dickerson's argument, stating that due
process was not violated even though Dickerson might suffer financial hardship. Id.
An informal hearing will satisfy the hearing requirement. United States v. Rohm and
Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1987).
105. Courts have held that site owners and operators, but not generators and trans-
porters, may claim EPA's trespass was a violation of due process. First, the generator
or transporter is usually not the owner of the sites used. Cf United States v. Northeast-
ern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (chemical plant
officers who did not own or operate the farm where chemicals were dumped could not
be considered the owners or operators of the dump site), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 146
(1987). Second, generators and transporters typically abandon the waste and therefore
do not retain an ownership interest in it. Third, courts allow the taking of a site for
remedial action as a valid exercise of the EPA's police power. Finally, rehabilitation
will likely vest the property with a higher value than it had as a waste site.
106. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Because generators and
transporters usually lack an ownership interest in the affected property, the court might
dismiss their "taking" suit for lack of standing.
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taking clause of the fifth amendment."°7 The fifth amendment, how-
ever, does not require compensation for a taking if the taking furthers
public health, safety, or welfare.' 08 The Mytinger Court noted that the
government does not violate due process when it destroys property for
the protection of the public, even if it fails to notify the owner or hold a
hearing. 9 Clearly, a hazardous waste site endangers the public
health. Thus, the fifth amendment does not require the EPA to com-
pensate potentially responsible parties for action taken to alleviate risks
associated with the site. 10
CERCLA's preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review is further
supported by analogy to relevant portions of the Veterans' Administra-
tion Act. The Supreme Court has upheld a section of the Act preclud-
ing judicial review of some Veterans' Administration (VA) decisions.
The Court held preclusion of certain VA claims was necessary to avoid
overburdening the courts and the VA.11' Similarly, in the context of
CERCLA, the number of potentially appealable agency actions is im-
mense.'1 2 Due to multiple dumpings, innumerable parties may be po-
tentially responsible for a given CERCLA site.113 VA claims are
107. The Constitution's fifth amendment provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
108. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (citing
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 652, 655 (1887)) "[AIll property in this country is held
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the
community."
109. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. at 599-600; see also Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 300 (1981) (public health and safety
protection is a paramount government interest justifying summary administrative ac-
tion); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) ("For the protection of public
health [the legislature] may order the summary destruction of property without prior
notice or hearing.").
110. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently
addressed the "taking" issue in United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F.
Supp. 1260, 1270-71 (D. Mass. 1988). The court held that if the EPA determines it can
complete the necessary remedial action at a site without acquiring the property, the
EPA need not take the property; consequently, a taking claim will not arise.
111. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1974). The Veteran's Administra-
tion Act appears at 38 U.S.C. §§ 201-46 (1988). The provision which precludes judicial
review of the Administrator's determinations appears at 38 U.S.C. § 211 (1988).
112. See supra note 4 for discussion of the number of hazardous waste sites in the
United States.
113. See, e.g., Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 883 (3d Cir. 1985)
(142 PRPs), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1970 (1986); Pacific Resins & Chem., Inc. v. United
States, 654 F. Supp. 249, 251 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (198 PRPs); United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (289 generators or transporters).
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precluded from review to ensure that complex determinations of VA
policy regarding veterans' benefits are made adequately and uniformly.
By analogy, preclusion of CERCLA claim review ensures that complex
determinations of EPA policy regarding hazardous waste are made ad-
equately and uniformly. Thus, courts should uphold the statutory pre-
clusion of judicial review created in section 113(h).' 14
2. Standard and Scope of Review
Congress defined the standard and scope of judicial review of EPA
response actions, unaddressed prior to SARA, in section 1130) of
CERCLA. I" Congress also limited judicial review of response actions
114. But see Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F. Supp. 1043 (D.
Kan. 1987). Chemical Waste Management (CWM) operated a hazardous waste incin-
erator. The EPA, pursuant to CERCLA § 121 (d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(3) (Supp. IV
1986), declared the facility ineligible to receive wastes. Chemical Waste Management,
673 F. Supp. at 1055. Strictly speaking, CERCLA § 113(h) precludes a court's jurisdic-
tion in controversies arising under CERCLA § 121(d)(3). 673 F. Supp. at 1055. The
Chemical Waste Management court retained jurisdiction because: 1) EPA's shutdown
of CWM's incinerator caused the delay in cleanup, not CWM's lawsuit; and 2) CER-
CLA § 113 allowed companies like CWM to present evidence and to be heard after the
cleanup. In this case, however, where there would be no cleanup, due process would be
violated. Id. Further, CWM would suffer irreparable financial loss from the shutdown
of its incinerator. Id. at 1057.
In a similar case, SCA Servs. of Ind. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355 (N.D. Ind. 1986),
the court held a company could challenge CERCLA's constitutionality and a court had
jurisdiction to hear such a challenge. SCA operated a landfill in Indiana that the EPA
planned to list on the National Priorities List. Id. at 1357. SCA challenged the propo-
sal under the due process clause and the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 1358.
The court retained jurisdiction because SCA demonstrated a "realistic danger of sus-
taining direct injury" such as damage to reputation and loss of business goodwill, prop-
erty value, and use of the dump site. Id. at 1361. The court ultimately found for the
EPA on the merits. Id. at 1378, 1382.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9613j) (Supp. IV 1986) (added by SARA § 113(c)(2), 100 Stat.
1650). CERCLA § 1130) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Limitation
In any judicial action under this chapter, judicial review of any issues concerning
the adequacy of any response action taken or ordered by the President shall be
limited to the administrative record. Otherwise applicable principles of adminis-
trative law shall govern whether any supplemental materials may be considered by
the court.
(2) Standard
In considering objections raised in any judicial action under this chapter, the
court shall uphold the President's decision . . . unless the objecting party can
demonstrate ... that the decision was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in
accordance with law.
CERCLA § 113(j), 42 U.S.C. § 96130) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
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to the administrative record, but stated that courts should apply ad-
ministrative law principles when considering the admissibility of sup-
plemental materials."1 6 Thus, the courts will uphold response actions
not found to be "arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law."'1 17 If the court finds a response action unlawful, it may
only award response costs, damages, or other relief that is not inconsis-
tent with the National Contingency Plan." 8 In adding this provision
to CERCLA, Congress attempted to balance the need for judicial effi-
ciency with the need for protection against EPA abuse." 9
IV. POTENTIAL RESPONSES
A. Participation in Recordmaking
Congress mandated in CERCLA section 113(k)(1) 120 that the EPA
create an administrative record which will serve as the basis for post-
enforcement judicial review. 2 1 Congress enumerated participation
procedures for the development of the administrative record in section
113(k)(2).' 22 The legislative command that courts should rely on the
116. CERCLA § 1130)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); but see United
States v. Hardage, 663 F. Supp. 1280 (W.D. Okla. 1987). After ruling that CERCLA
§ 1130) did not apply retroactively, the Hardage court suggested in dicta that CER-
CLA § 1130) allows de novo review of proposed EPA remedies when the agency sues
for injunctive relief under CERCLA § 106(a). 663 F. Supp. at 1283. The court noted
that CERCLA § 1130)(1) refers to "response action taken or ordered by the President."
Therefore, if the court issued injunctive relief, the court, and not the President, would
be ordering the response action. Id. at 1284. The court implied, however, that judicial
review based on the administrative record may apply to CERCLA § 107 cost-recovery
actions. Id. at 1285.
117. See supra note 115 for text of CERCLA § 1130)(2). In United States v. Sey-
mour Recycling Corp., 679 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Ind. 1987), the court addressed the con-
stitutionality of review of the administrative record under the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. Citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court held
that such review did not violate the due process rights of generators so long as the
generators were given a meaningful opportunity to comment. Seymour, 679 F. Supp. at
863-65.
118. See supra note 115 for text of CERCLA § 1130)(3).
119. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 81 (1985).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). The statute provides that "[t]he Presi-
dent shall establish an administrative record upon which the President shall base the
selection of a response action." Id
121. Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(k)(2) (1986). The statute gives the President the authority to
provide for the participation of interested persons, including [PRPs], in the develop-
ment of the administrative record. The procedures for developing the record include:
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administrative record suggests that potentially responsible parties
should fully participate in the record's creation to preserve issues for
future litigation. A party should not depend on the court to consider
supplemental material. 123 The generator or transporter should assess
EPA cleanup proposals and provide comments and alternatives. Po-
tential parties should continue this commentary during the waste site's
rehabilitation, observe the project, and prepare for a potential EPA
cost-recovery suit. 124
Judicial review based on the administrative record, however, may
not provide the court with adequate and understandable scientific evi-
dence. 12- Therefdre, potential parties should document thoroughly
any comments submitted to the EPA in terms that a nontechnical
judge can understand.
B. Public Participation
CERCLA section 117126 provides that the EPA shall publish a no-
tice and an analysis of plans for remedial action before commencing
cleanup. Further, the EPA must provide a reasonable opportunity for
written and oral comments and an opportunity for a public meeting to
(i) Notice to potentially affected persons and the public, which shall be accompanied by
a brief analysis of the plan and alternative plans considered. (ii) A reasonable opportu-
nity to comment and provide information regarding the plan. (iii) An opportunity for a
public meeting in the affected area.... (iv) A response to each of the significant com-
ments, criticisms, and new data submitted in written or oral presentations. (v) A state-
ment of the basis and purpose of the selected action. Id.
123. But see United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 669 F. Supp. 672, 683 (D.N.J.
1987) (where inadequacies in an administrative record frustrate proper judicial review
of agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court should remand
the case to the underlying agency or allow supplementation of the record).
In United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5139 (E.D. Pa. 1987), the
court stated that it may allow supplementation of the record "when the administrative
record does not disclose the factors that were considered or the agency's construction of
the evidence," when there is a showing of bad faith or improper behavior by the EPA,
or when the reasons asserted by the EPA for its actions are inadequate. Id. at 10-11.
124. Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. EPA, 777 F.2d 882, 887 (3d Cir. 1985), cert,
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 (1986). The PRP might consider the creation of a photographic
record of the remedial action and the use of an independent licensed professional engi-
neer who could serve as a witness in court.
125. The potential problem stems from scientific illiteracy in the judicial system.
Ninety-five percent of the United States population is technically illiterate. CHEMICAL
& ENG'G NEws, Dec. 7, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (Supp. IV 1986).
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address the plans.127 Potential parties should attend meetings which
pertain to their site.
C. Third Party Suits
A generator or transporter may attempt to redistribute its costs to
other parties through a citizen suit under CERCLA section 310.128
Section 310 allows a person to sue an alleged CERCLA violator or the
EPA when it fails to perform a nondiscretionary duty.129 One court
has suggested that a party might use the citizen suit provision to chal-
lenge the adequacy of an EPA-selected remedy. 130 The citizen suit
provision does not apply to the delay of section 104 response actions,
however, because section 310 expressly precludes citizen suits if a con-
flict would arise with section 113(h). Thus, a citizen suit may not be
brought to challenge a removal or remedial response action under sec-
tion 104.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held in Cabot Corporation v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency 3' that it did not have jurisdiction in a citizen suit
alleging the EPA failed to perform nondiscretionary duties. 132 The
127. Id.
128. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510,
§ 310 (as added Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 206, 100 Stat. 1703, as codified at
42 U.S.C. § 9659). CERCLA § 310 allows any person to "commence a civil action on
his own behalf against any person (including the United States and any other govern-
mental instrumentality...) who is alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, or order.. .; or against the President or any other officer of the
United States [including the EPA Administrator] where there is alleged a failure to
perform any act or duty under [CERCLA]." CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Supp.
IV 1986)
129. CERCLA § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (Supp. IV 1986) (added by SARA § 206,
100 Stat. 1703).
130. Artesian Water Co. v. County of New Castle, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1290 n.39 (D.
Del. 1987). Groundwater pollution from a New Castle County landfill threatened Arte-
sian Water Company's water supply. Id. at 1276. Artesian sued the County and sub-
mitted a claim against the Superfund, alleging that it suffered damage of a natural
resource. Id. at 1276, 1287. Although judicial review is normally unavailable prior to
EPA enforcement, the court noted that Artesian might challenge the EPA's proposed
response action under the citizen suit provision if the EPA's response fails to provide
the water company with an alternative water supply. Id. at 1290 n.39.
131. 677 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
132. Id. at 825-26. The PRPs alleged that the EPA failed to contract with the state,
select the most cost-effective remedial plan, and modify the administrative record "to
include detailed cost data on all the environmentally acceptable remedial alternatives."
Id. at 825.
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court found that citizen suits by hazardous waste transporters and gen-
erators would be contrary to CERCLA's philosophy of providing im-
mediate waste-site cleanup. 133
CERCLA section 113(i)13 1 provides for intervention by right to par-
ties who possess an interest in the underlying litigation. Intervention,
however, may expose the intervening party to liability. Nevertheless, a
party may wish to intervene to ensure that the court equitably appor-
tions liability to all parties involved.
The generator or transporter probably cannot compel the EPA to
impose response-action costs on other parties. While joinder was avail-
able before SARA through the use of Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 135 the courts have not viewed joinder as compulsory
because joint and several liability precludes such parties' indispensabil-
ity.136 As the United States v. A & F Materials Co. court noted, how-
ever, a party may implead a third-party defendant using Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 137
D. Contribution
Prior to SARA, most courts allowed contribution in CERCLA
cases. 138 SARA, through CERCLA section 113(f), 13 9 codified the
133. Id. at 828.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) (Supp. IV 1986). The statute provides that "any person
may intervene as a matter of right when such person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest.. ." Id.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a), (b) (joinder of persons needed for just
adjudication).
136. United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1260-61 (S.D. Ill,
1984). But see O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1988). In
O'Leary, the district court held that the EPA, which was conducting a remedial investi-
gation and feasibility study on the landfill pursuant to CERCLA, could be joined as a
indispensible party to a bankruptcy proceeding. Despite the EPA's assertion that judi-
cial review must be deferred until the completion of the cleanup, the court held that it
had the equitable power to join the EPA. Id. at 814-19. The court also held that the
bankruptcy receiver may attempt to join the EPA through a citizen suit. Id. at 815-16.
137. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (defining the terms by which a defendant may
bring in a third party).
138. The following cases held that contribution was available: United States v.
County of New Castle, 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Del. 1986); United States v. Conserva-
tion Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness
Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1985); but see United States v. Westinghouse, 22 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (CERCLA does not imply a cause of action for
contribution).
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common law and specifically authorized contribution 1" actions by
parties subject to CERCLA liability against other potentially liable
parties. The courts may resolve contribution claims by using appropri-
ate equitable factors to allocate response costs among responsible
parties. 14
1
Unfortunately, the apportionment problem remains. The fair value
of the response cost attributable to a given company's waste may be
based on many factors, including volume, toxicity, and migratory po-
tential. '42 One solution is to require each responsible party to bear a
pro rata share of the response costs. This solution, however, would
unfairly burden contributors of insignificant amounts of waste at the
site. Until more cases are resolved under SARA, a generator or trans-
porter should not rely on the possibility of recovering response costs
through contribution unless he is prepared for either protracted arbi-
tration or adjudication.
E. Settlement
Finally, Congress enacted CERCLA section 122143 to encourage
early settlement of claims between the EPA and responsible parties.144
139. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (Supp. IV 1986) (added by SARA § 113(b), 100 Stat.
1647).
140. For a detailed discussion of contribution under CERCLA, see Garber, Federal
Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 365 (1987).
141. CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
142. United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 401 (W.D. Mo.
1985). Courts may also consider the degree of involvement and the care exercised by
parties responsible for site creation, as well as the cooperation the parties demonstrated
in preventing public health or environmental problems. United States v. Tyson, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 841 at 11 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
The EPA published interim guidelines for the allocation of responsibility in 52 Fed.
Reg. 19,919 (1987). The guidelines affirm the use of volume, toxicity, and mobility as
factors for the allocation of responsibility. Id. The EPA will also consider settlement
criteria such as the "strength of evidence tracing the wastes at a site to PRPs, the ability
of PRPs to pay, litigative risks in proceeding to trial, public interest considerations,
precedential value, value of obtaining a present sum certain, inequities and aggravating
factors, and nature of the case that remains after settlement." Id. The EPA will often
discount toxicity when allocating responsibility because toxicity is often difficult to de-
termine, controversial, and seldom "causally related" to the cleanup cost. Id. at 19,920.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 9622 (Supp. IV 1986).
144. CERCLA § 122(a) provides that "[w]henever practicable and in the public in-
terest, as determined by the President, the President shall act to facilitate agreements
under this section that are in the public interest and consistent with the National Con-
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Because the legislature has precluded claims for contribution between
settlers and other responsible parties, 145 the generator or transporter
may desire to settle at the earliest possible date. Early settlement, how-
ever, is like a roll of the dice: it may minimize liability if more exten-
sive contamination is found, or it may compensate the government "for
claims on which the government would not have prevailed." 146 A gen-
erator or transporter's settlement strategy will thus depend on the ex-
tent of that party's aversion to risk. A risk-averse party might prefer a
cash settlement offer to solidify its financial liability, while a risk-taking
party may choose to perform future remedial work at the site, hoping
that less cleanup than expected will be required.
V. CONCLUSION
The preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial review of CERCLA re-
medial actions is founded upon two legitimate bases: the lack of a final
agency action and the potential frustration of the Act's purposes.
Although courts could impose joint and several liability upon hazard-
ous waste generators and transporters in CERCLA remedial actions,
Congress affords these parties an opportunity for a hearing and a judi-
cial determination before the court imposes liability. Further, Con-
gress has constructed CERCLA so as to protect potential parties from
EPA abuse. Thus, Congress' preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial re-
view concerning CERCLA claims is a rational and constitutional ex-
tension of existing common law.
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